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a b s t r a c t
We introduce a new solution concept for 2-person bargaining problems, which can be considered as the
dual of the Equal-Area solution (EA) (see Anbarcı and Bigelow (1994)). Hence, we call it the Dual Equal-
Area solution (DEA). We show that the point selected by the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (see Kalai and
Smorodinsky (1975)) lies in between those that are selected by EA and DEA. We formulate an axiom –
area-based fairness – and offer three characterizations of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution in which this
axiom plays a central role.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In a bargaining problem two players need to agree on a util-
ity allocation from a feasible set of allocations, S ⊂ R2
+
. Failure
to reach an agreement leads to a status quo utility of zero for each
player. A bargaining solution describes how the players solve every
conceivable bargaining problem; formally, a solution is a function
that chooses a unique point from every such S. One basic require-
ment on a bargaining solution is fairness, in the sense that when-
ever more options become feasible, no one should get hurt. Since
a bargaining problem is an infinite object, there are many ways of
defining how ‘‘more options become feasible’’. [4] proposed the fol-
lowing fairness requirement, which is based on the area of S: if the
area of S increases, no one should get hurt. Moreover, they showed
that there is a unique solution (equal-area solution) which satisfies
this property (area monotonicity) and strong Pareto optimality on
the domain of convex problems. The equal-area solution assigns
to each S the point on its frontier, x, such that the line segment
between the origin and x splits S into two parts of equal areas. In-
formally, the equal-area solution can be considered as an applica-
tion of the egalitarian principle on an area measure of concessions.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2016.11.003
0167-6377/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.[2,5], and [3] provided noncooperative and dynamic foundations
for the equal-area solution.
We introduce a new concept into the bargaining literature –
duality – and apply it to the equal-area solution. The resulting
solution is the dual equal-area solution. This solution applies
the egalitarian principle on an area measure of aspirations. We
formulate a requirement – area-based fairness – which stipulates
that when these two solutions propose the same point, then this
point should be chosen as the solution point. We derive three
characterizations of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (see [9]) on the
basis of area-based fairness and some standard axioms.
Section 2 describes the bargaining model. Section 3 introduces
duality. Section 4 introduces area-based fairness. The characteriza-
tion results are in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. The bargaining model: definitions
The following is a simple version of the bargaining model
in [10]. A bargaining problem is a compact and comprehensive set
S ⊂ R2
+
that contains 0 ≡ (0, 0) as well as some x with x > 0,
where vector inequalities are defined as follows: uRv if and only if
uiRvi for each i, for both R ∈ {>,≥}, and u 	 v if and only if u ≥ v
and u ≠ v. The set S (the feasible set) is a menu of utility-pairs
out of which a single point needs to be agreed upon. Agreement
on xmeans that the bargaining problem is resolved and each agent
i obtains the utility xi; failure to reach an agreement leads to the
status quo utilities, 0. The assumption S ∩ R2
++
≠ ∅ implies that
E. Karagözoğlu, S. Rachmilevitch / Operations Research Letters 45 (2017) 30–33 31Fig. 1. EA and DEA in convex and non-convex problems.the status quo can be abandoned in a way that makes both agents
better off (relative to the status quo). The assumption that S is
comprehensive — namely, that x ∈ S ⇒ y ∈ S for every y that
satisfies 0 ≤ y ≤ x – means that utilities can be freely disposed
(down to the status quo levels). Given a problem S, the ideal point
of S, a(S), is defined by ai(S) ≡ max{si : s ∈ S}. The number ai(S)
is called agent i’s ideal payoff. The collection of problems is denoted
by B. Let Bco ≡ {S ∈ B : S is convex}.
A solution on a bargaining domain D ⊂ B is a function f :D →
R2
+
that satisfies f (S) ∈ S for every S ∈ D .
Given a function ψ:R2 → R2 and a set C ⊂ R2, we let
ψ ◦ C ≡ {ψ ◦ c : c ∈ C}. A solution f is scale covariant if for
every problem S and every pair of positive linear transformations,
l = (l1, l2), it is true that f (l◦S) = l◦f (S). A solution f satisfies con-
traction independence if f (T ) ∈ S ⊂ T ⇒ f (S) = f (T ). Contraction
independence has first been introduced by [10] (under the name
independence of irrelevant alternatives). Restricted contraction inde-
pendence, introduced by [12], narrows the scope of the axiom: it
imposes the requirement of contraction independence only on pairs
of problems, {S, T }, that in addition to the condition of contraction
independence share the same ideal point. Another axiom that we
will use and that also imposes a restriction on nested problems
with a common ideal point is restricted monotonicity (introduced
by [13]). It requires [S ⊂ T&a(S) = a(T )] ⇒ f (S) ≤ f (T ). Finally,
f is continuous if for each sequence of problems {Sk} that converges
to a problem S in the Hausdorff topology, f (Sk) converges to f (S).
Given v > 0, the comprehensive hull of {v} is comp{v} ≡ {x ∈
R2
+
: x ≤ v}. Given a set A ⊂ R2
+
, A denotes the closure of A.
3. Duality
Given a problem S with S ≠ comp{a(S)}, we define the dual
problem of S as D(S) ≡ comp{a(S)} \ S.
At an informal level, one can think of the following story as
underlining a bargaining problem: the agents ‘‘start’’ at the origin,
and they need to move forward, towards the frontier, and reach an
agreed-upon point. Then, the informal story corresponding to the
dual problem is that the agents ‘‘start’’ at the ideal point and they
need to concede to move towards the frontier and reach a feasible
point.
We define the duality transformation, φS = (φS,1, φS,2), by
φS,i(x) ≡ −(x − ai(S)). The transformations φS,1 and φS,2 shift the
ideal point to the origin and then ‘‘mirror’’ the resulting set, car-
rying it from the south-west quadrant to the north-east one. Note
that for every S ∈ B such that S ≠ comp{a(S)}wehaveφS◦D(S) ∈
B. More generally, a bargaining domain D is closed under duality
if [S ∈ D]&[S ≠ comp{a(S)}] ⇒ φS ◦ D(S) ∈ D . In this paper,
we consider two domains: the grand domain B and its subset Bco.
The former is closed under duality, whereas the latter is not.Let D be a domain such that (i) it is closed under duality and
(ii) no S ∈ D contains a boundary with a segment parallel to an
axis. Let f and f̃ be two solutions on D . The solution f̃ is the dual of
f on D if the following holds for all S ∈ D:
f̃ (S) = φ−1S ◦ f (φS ◦ D(S)), (1)
whereφ−1S,i is the inverse ofφS,i. Inwords, duality says that applying
f̃ to S is same as ‘‘standing at a(S)’’ and applying f to D(S).
Requirement (i)makes sure thatφS ◦D(S) on the RHS of (1) belongs
toD . Requirement (ii) guarantees that 0 is the ‘‘ideal point’’ ofD(S).
The egalitarian solution (see [8]) and the equal-loss solution
(see [6]) are two solutions that are duals of each other. The
former assigns to each S the intersection point of its (weak) Pareto
frontier and the 45°-line, whereas the latter assigns to each S
the intersection point of its (weak) Pareto frontier and the 45°-
line drawn from a(S). On the other hand, the Kalai–Smorodinsky
solution, which is defined by KS(S) ≡ max{λ : λa(S) ∈ S}×a(S) is
dual to itself (i.e., Eq. (1) holds with f = f̃ = KS) on the domain of
problemswith a boundary that does not contain a segment parallel
to an axis.
4. Area-based fairness
The equal-area solution (see [4]) assigns to each S the point of
its Pareto frontier, x, such that the segment conv{0, x} splits S into
two subsets of equal areas (see Fig. 1). In this paper, we introduce
the dual of this solution, which we call the dual equal-area solution.
For each S, this solution assigns the Pareto efficient x such that
conv{x, a(S)} splitsD(S) into two subsets of equal areas (see Fig. 1).
We denote the equal-area solution and its dual by EA and DEA,
respectively.
Aswementioned in the Introduction, for convex S, EA is the only
strongly Pareto optimal solution satisfying the requirement that no
one loses when the area of S increases. Analogously, DEA satisfies
the following property: when the area of S decreases and the ideal
point is unchanged, no one benefits. DEA satisfies some standard
axioms such as Pareto optimality, symmetry, and scale covariance.
EA and DEA demonstrate that there are at least two ways to
define egalitarianism on the basis of areas: the original way of [4]
and the dual way of DEA introduced here. We seek to merge them
into a single fairness criterion. We believe that any reasonable
merging would adhere to the following requirement:
Definition 1. A solution f satisfies area-based fairness if for each S
the following holds:
EA(S) = DEA(S) = x ⇒ f (S) = x.
That is, in those cases where the two solutions agree, the area-
based fairness property requires this agreed-upon point to be the
solution-point.
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The following results use the fact that DEA satisfies scale
covariance (Lemma 1) and KS i(S) is sandwiched between EAi(S)
and DEAi(S) for every S ∈ B and i = 1, 2 (Lemma 2). The
statements and proofs of these lemmas are in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. A solution on B satisfies area-based fairness and
restricted contraction independence if and only if it is the Kalai–
Smorodinsky solution.
Proof. Clearly, KS satisfies both axioms (see Lemma 2 for area-
based fairness). Conversely, let f be a solution that satisfies them.
Further, let S ∈ B and let x = KS(S). We will prove that f (S) = x.
Let V ≡ {y ∈ R2
+
: y ≤ (a1(S), x2)} ∪ {y ∈ R2+ :
y ≤ (x1, a2(S))}. By area-based fairness, f (V ) = x. By restricted
contraction independence, f (S) = x. 
Under scale covariance, restricted contraction independence can be
replaced by restricted monotonicity.
Theorem 2. A solution on B satisfies area-based fairness, re-
stricted monotonicity, and scale covariance if and only if it is the
Kalai–Smorodinsky solution.
Proof. Clearly, KS satisfies all axioms. Conversely, let f be a
solution that satisfies them and let S ∈ B. We will prove that
f (S) = KS(S). By scale covariance, we can assume that a(S) =
(1, 1). Let T ≡ π ◦S, where π is the non-identity permutation; i.e.,
π(a, b) ≡ (b, a). Let V ≡ S ∩ T . Since V is symmetric with respect
to the 45°-line, area-based fairness implies that f (V ) = KS(V ) =
KS(S). By restricted monotonicity, f (S) = KS(S). 
Wedo not knowwhether scale covariance can be dispensedwith in
Theorem 2. Nevertheless, Theorem 3 shows that, on the restricted
domain of convex problems, it can be dispensed with.
Theorem 3. A solution on Bco satisfies area-based fairness and
restricted monotonicity if and only if it is the Kalai–Smorodinsky
solution.
Proof. By Lemma 2, KS satisfies area-based fairness, and it clearly
satisfies restricted monotonicity. Conversely, let f satisfy both
axioms; and let S be a convex problem. We will prove that f (S) =
KS(S). Let V ≡ conv{0, (a1(S), 0), (0, a2(S)), KS(S)}. Note that
EA(V ) = DEA(V ) = KS(S). Therefore, by area-based fairness,
f (V ) = KS(S) and by restricted monotonicity, f (S) = KS(S). 
6. Closing comments
The central solution in the bargaining literature is the Nash
solution (see [10]), which assigns to each convex S the maximizer
of x1 · x2 over x ∈ S. The Kalai–Smorodinsky solution, in contrast
to Nash solution, is well-defined also on the domain of non-
convex problems. There is a small literature that considers its
characterization on this domain. We contribute to this literature,
which includes [1,7,11], and [14].
Our paper also reveals the non-trivial fact that the Kalai–
Smorodinsky solution can be founded on the basis of area-related
notions, a fact that can be viewed as a conceptual link between this
solution and the Nash solution. An alternative area-related notion
of duality between these solutions, one that has been recognized
by [4], is as follows: the Nash solution selects themaximal point on
the diagonal of themaximal-area rectangle that is contained in the
bargaining problem, and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution selects
the maximal point on the diagonal of the minimal-area rectangle
that contains the bargaining problem.Fig. 2. Illustration of Case 4 in the Proof of Lemma 2.
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Appendix
Lemma 1. The dual equal-area solution satisfies scale covariance.
It is not hard to prove that DEA satisfies scale covariance and the
proof follows the samearguments used to prove that EA is scale
covariant (see [4, pp. 137–138]). Hence, we omit the proof for the
sake of brevity.
Lemma 2. The following holds for every S ∈ B:
min{EAi(S),DEAi(S)} ≤ KS i(S) ≤ max{EAi(S),DEAi(S)}.
Proof. Let S ∈ B. First, note that by scale covariance (satisfied
by KS, EA, and DEA), we can assume that a(S) = (1, 1). Now, let
x = KS(S), y = EA(S), and z = DEA(S). Clearly, x belongs to the 45-
degree line in this normalized problem.Wewill prove that for each
i = 1, 2, min{yi, zi} ≤ xi ≤ max{yi, zi}. Without loss of generality,
we focus on the case where y is either on or above the 45-degree
line.
Denote the equal areas generated by y as A1y(S) and A
2
y(S). It is
easy to see that y also divides D(S) into two (not necessarily equal)
areas. Denote them by B1y(D(S)) and B
2
y(D(S)). Since y is either on







But since A1y(S) = A
2





This inequality implies four possibilities concerning the location of
z on the frontier of S. Before analyzing these four cases, first note
that if y is on the 45-degree line (i.e., y = x), then because all weak
inequalities above are satisfied as equalities, it follows that z = x:
so, we are done. Therefore, below we consider situations where y
is above the 45-degree line.
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implies B1y(D(S)) < B
2
y(D(S)). On the other hand, by definition,
B1z (D(S)) = B
2
z (D(S)). Hence, z = y implies a contradiction.
By the same argument, the inequalities y1 > z1 and y2 < z2
(i.e., z is to the north-west of y) also lead to a contradiction.
Case 2: z is below the 45-degree line. Then, x is sandwiched by
y and z.
Case 3: x = z. Note that z divides D(S) into two equal areas,
denoted by B1z (D(S)) and B
2
z (D(S)). It also divides S into two (not
necessarily equal) areas. Denote them by A1z (S) and A
2
z (S). If z is on
the 45-degree line, then A1z (S)+B
1





implies that A1z (S) = A
2
z (S), contradicting y ≠ z. It is worthwhile
emphasizing here that if any two of {x, y, z} coincide, then they all
coincide.
Case 4: y1 < z1 and y2 > z2 (i.e., z is to the east of y) but
z is still above the 45-degree line. Since z is above the 45-degree
line, A1z (S)+ B
1




z (D(S)). Given that B
1
z (D(S)) =
B2z (D(S)), we have that A
1
z (S) < A
2
z (S). On the other hand, given
that A1y(S) = A
2
y(S) and z is to the south-east of y, we have that
A1z (S) > A
2
z (S), a contradiction. 
Lemma 2 says that KS is ‘‘sandwiched’’ between EA and DEA (see
Fig. 2). This implies that KS satisfies area-based fairness, a fact that
plays a central role in our characterizations.References
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